Malware still constitutes a major threat in the cybersecurity landscape, also due to the widespread use of infection vectors such as documents and other media formats. These infection vectors hide embedded malicious code to the victim users, thus facilitating the use of social engineering techniques to infect their machines. In the last decade, machine-learning algorithms provided an effective defense against such threats, being able to detect malware embedded in various infection vectors. However, the existence of an arms race in an adversarial setting like that of malware detection has recently questioned their appropriateness for this task. In this work, we focus on malware embedded in PDF files, as a representative case of how such an arms race can evolve. We first provide a comprehensive taxonomy of PDF malware attacks, and of the various learning-based detection systems that have been proposed to detect them. Then, we discuss more sophisticated attack algorithms that craft evasive PDF malware oriented to bypass such systems. We describe state-of-the-art mitigation techniques, highlighting that designing robust machine-learning algorithms remains a challenging open problem. We conclude the paper by providing a set of guidelines for designing more secure systems against the threat of adversarial malicious PDF files. :2 D. Maiorca et al.
INTRODUCTION
Malware for X86 (and more recently for mobile architectures) is still considered one of the top threats in computer security. While it is common to think that the most dangerous attacks are crafted using plain executable files (especially on Windows-based operating systems), security reports showed that the most dangerous attacks in the wild were carried out by using infection vectors [50] . With this term, we define non-executable files whose aim is exploiting vulnerabilities of third-party applications to trigger download (or direct execution) of executable payloads. Using such vectors gives attackers multiple advantages. First, they can exploit the structure of third-party anticipate the attacker to build more secure systems [9] . Note that such a choice may introduce a trade-off between the accuracy of the system and its robustness against such attacks, but this is not always the case.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a general overview of the PDF file format; Section 3 describes the possible attacks in the wild that can be carried out against PDF readers; Section 4 depicts the various detection methodologies that have been introduced in these years; Section 5 describes the adversarial attacks that can be carried out by exploiting learning-based vulnerabilities; Section 6 provides a discussion of the problems related to adversarial malware detection. Section 7 concludes the paper.
OVERVIEW OF PDF FILES
Digital documents, albeit different concerning the way their readers parse them, share some essential aspects. In particular, they can be typically represented as a combination of two components: a general structure that represents the way in which the document contents are stored, and the file content that represents the information that is properly visualized to the user (such as text, images, code). From the perspective of security, the content of the file can be intended as scripting code (e.g., JavaScript, ActionScript, Visual Basic) that performs malicious operations. In this paper, we will show how these two elements are realized in PDF files. In particular, in this Section, we provide an insight into their structure by showing their basic blocks. In Section 3, we focus on the file contents by describing the possible attacks that can be carried out with malicious scripting code.
PDF (Portable Document Format) is one of the most used formats, along with Microsoft Office, to render digital documents. Thanks to its support for third-party technologies such as JavaScript and ActionScript, PDF can also be used for rendering images, compiling forms, showing animations, and so forth. A PDF file can be conceptually considered as a graph of objects, each of them performing specific actions (e.g., displaying text, rendering images, executing code, and so forth). The typical structure of a PDF file is showed in Figure 1 , and it consists of four parts [1, 3] :
• Header. A single line of text containing information about the PDF file version. Such a line is introduced by the marker %. • Body. A sequence of objects that define the operations performed by the file. Such objects can also contain compressed or uncompressed embedded data (e.g., text, images, scripting code). Each object possesses a unique reference number, typically introduced by the sequence number 0 obj 1 , where number is the proper object number. PDF objects can be referenced by others by using the sequence number 0 R 2 , where number identifies the target object that is referenced. Each object is ended by the endobj marker. The functionality of each object is described by keywords (also known as name objects -highlighted in bold in the Figure) , which are typically introduced by /. • Cross-Reference (X-Ref) Table. A list of offsets that indicate the position of each object in the file. Such a list gives the reader precise indications on where to begin parsing each object. The Cross-Reference Table is introduced by the marker xref, followed by a sequence of numbers, whose last indicates the total number of objects in the file. Each line of the table corresponds to a specific object, but only lines that end with n are related to objects that are concretely stored in the file. It is worth noting that the reader parses only the objects that are referenced by the X-Ref Table. Therefore, it is possible to find objects that are stored in the file, but that lack their reference in the table. 1 The value between number and obj is called generation number, and it is typically 0. It can be different in some corner cases, but we recommend to refer to the official documentation for more information. 2 The value between number and R is the same generation number as the original object.
• Trailer. A special object that describes some basic elements of the file, such as the first object of the graph (i.e., where the reader should start parsing the file information). Moreover, it contains references to the file metadata, which are typically stored in one single object. The keyword trailer always introduces the trailer object. PDF files are parsed as follows: first, the trailer object is parsed by the reader to retrieve the first object of the hierarchy. Then, each object of the PDF graph (contained in the body) is explored and rendered by combining information contained in the X- Ref Table with the references numbers found inside each object. Every PDF file is concluded by a %%EOF (End Of File) marker.
Before providing more details about how PDF objects are structured, it is important to underline two characteristics of PDF files, which are also relevant concerning their security.
• Adobe Reader is robust against malformed objects. Such robustness means that, even if one object does not perfectly follow the PDF specifications, Reader will either try to fix it or to ignore it. While this allows flexibility to address the complexity of the PDF format and of the tools that can generate such files, it also allows attackers to inject malformed material or, in general, to manipulate more easily the content of the objects. • PDF files can be updated without being regenerated from scratch (although the latter is possible). This process is also called versioning. When an existing object is modified, or new objects are added to the file, a new body, X-Ref If an existing object is changed, the new object is saved in the new body and will be referenced instead of the previous one. It is also worth noting that the original object will not be deleted, but will be simply kept in the previous body.
PDF Objects
As objects constitute the core of every PDF file, we now provide a more detailed insight into their structure. As previously said, objects are typically identified by a number, and they are more formally referred to as indirect objects. However, every element inside the body is generally regarded as an object, even if a number does not identify it. When an object is not identified by a number (i.e., when its part of other objects), it is called direct. There are seven types of objects (that can be either direct or indirect):
• boolean, i.e., a variable which can be True or False;
• numeric, i.e., a real or integer value;
• string, i.e., a sequence of characters between parentheses ( ), or a sequence of hexadecimal characters between angle brackets < >; • name, i.e., a literal sequence of characters that starts with a forward slash /;
• array, i.e., a sequence of objects between square brackets [ ];
• dictionary, i.e., an object composed by a sequence of key-value pairs, enclosed by double angle brackets << >> (e.g., the trailer object is a dictionary); • stream, i.e., a special object consisting of a dictionary and a sequence of data (typically, compressed text or images), introduced by the keyword stream. Indirect objects are typically composed of a combination of direct objects. Listing 1 reports a typical example of PDF object. Most of the times, indirect objects (in this case, the object is number 8) are dictionaries (enclosed in << >>) that contain sequences of coupled direct objects. Each couple typically provides specific information about the object. The object in the listing contains a sequence of three couples of objects, which perform the following actions:
(1) The first couple is composed of a name object (/Filter) and an array of only one element (/FlateDecode). This sequence tells us that the object contains compressed stream data. The type of compression is defined through filters. FlateDecode is one of the most used. (2) The second couple is made of a name object (/Length) and an integer (384). This couple provides information about the length (i.e., 384 bytes) of the subsequent stream. (3) The third couple is made of two name objects, /Type and /EmbeddedFiles, and it provides information about the type of stream (in this case, an embedded file) that the object stores. Objects that contain streams always feature the markers stream and endstream at the very end, meaning that PDF objects first instruct the reader about their functionality, then on the data type they operate.
Among the various types of objects, there are some that perform actions such as executing JavaScript code, opening embedded files, or even performing automatic actions when the file is opened or closed. To this end, the PDF language resorts to specific name objects (keywords) that are typically associated with actions that can have repercussions from a security perspective. Among the others, we mention /JavaScript and /JS for executing JavaScript code; /Names, /OpenAction, /AA for performing automatic actions; /EmbeddedFile and /F for opening embedded Use-After-Free (ROP chains) JavaScript files; /AcroForm to execute forms. The presence of such objects should be considered as a first hint that somebody may perform malicious actions. However, as such objects are also widely used in benign files, it may be quite hard to establish the maliciousness of the file by only inspecting them.
ATTACKS AGAINST PDF READERS
As previously mentioned, the majority of attacks that are carried out using documents resort to scripting codes to execute malicious code. Therefore, after having described the general structure of PDF files, we now provide an insight into the security issues related to the contents that can be embedded in the file. To do so, we provide a taxonomy of the various attacks that can be perpetrated by using PDF files. The common idea behind all attacks is that they exploit specific vulnerabilities of the reader components, and in particular of its plugins. Vulnerabilities can be characterized by multiple exploitation strategies, which also depend on the targeted reader component. Table 1 reports a list of the major PDF-based vulnerabilities that have been exploited in the wild (either with proofs-of-concept or proper malware) in the last decade, along with a brief description of their type and exploitation strategies. Notably, we did not include variants of the same vulnerability in the Table, and we only focused on the most representative ones. Such list has been obtained by analyzing exploit databases, media sources, security bulletins and our own file database retrieved from the VirusTotal service [18, 20, 24, 41, 43, 55, 60] . According to what we represented in Table 1 , there are three major ways to perform exploitation:
• JavaScript-based. These vulnerabilities are exploited by exclusively employing JavaScript code, and it is the most common way to perform exploitation. The attack code can be scattered through multiple objects in the file, or it can be contained in one single object (especially in older exploits) • ActionScript-based. These vulnerabilities exploit the capabilities of Adobe Reader of parsing Flash (ActionScript) files, due to the proper integration between Reader and Adobe Flash Player. ActionScript code can be used in combination to JavaScript to attain more effective exploitation. • File Embedding. This exploitation technique resorts to external file types, such as .bmp, .tiff and .exe. Typically, the exploitation is triggered when specific libraries of the reader attempt to parse such files. It is also possible to embed other PDF files: however, this is not considered as an exploitation technique, but more as a way to conceal other attacks (see the next sections for more details).
From this list, it can be observed that, although numerous vulnerabilities are still disclosed on Adobe Reader, only a few have been recently exploited in the wild. Such a tiny number of exploited vulnerabilities reflects the fact that PDF files are now less preferred as exploitation vectors by attackers. However, things can unexpectedly change when new, dangerous vulnerabilities are disclosed (such as CVE-2018-4990). In the following, we provide a more detailed description of the previously mentioned exploitation techniques, by also providing concrete examples from existing vulnerabilities.
JavaScript-Based Attacks
JavaScript-based attacks are the most used ones in PDF files due to the massive support that the file format provided to this scripting language. In particular, Adobe introduced specific API calls that are only supposed to be used in PDF files (their specifications are contained in the official Adobe references [2] ), and that can be exploited to execute unauthorized code on a machine.
Concerning the file structure, the presence of JavaScript is usually introduced by the name objects /JavaScript or /JS. Especially in malware, attackers tend to refer to objects containing such keywords multiple times. In some cases, the code can be scattered through multiple objects, especially when the scripting code implements multiple functionalities in different parts of the document. In the following, we provide an example of how a JavaScript code is reached and executed by exploring multiple objects. The code above can be easily explained as follows: the first object of the hierarchy is number 1, which refers to number 8 through the /Names keyword 3 , thus declaring that object 8 is related to JavaScript. Object 8 references to object 7 by labeling it hEb. Finally, object 7 declares that the true code (of type JavaScript, as explicitly stated by the keyword /S). The code in object 6 is compressed with a /FlateDecode filter, it is 452 bytes long, and it has not been reported in the listing for space reasons. This way of accessing JavaScript code is simple but very recurrent in PDF objects. Of course, much more complex strategies can be used to hide and scatter code through objects. According to the vulnerability types contained in Table 1 , multiple vulnerabilities can be exploited through JavaScript code. Such vulnerabilities can be organized in multiple categories, which we describe in the following:
• API-based Overflow. This vulnerability type typically exploits wrong argument parsing for specific API calls that belong to PDF parsing library, thus allowing attackers to perform buffer overflow or ROP-based attacks to complete the exploit. Typical examples of vulnerable APIs are util.printf and Collab.getIcon, which were among the first ones to be exploited when PDF attacks started to be massively used. • Use-After-Free. This vulnerability type is based on accessing memory areas that have been previously freed (and not re-initialized). Normally, such behavior would make the program crash. However, it could allow arbitrary code execution in a vulnerable program. • Malformed data. This vulnerability type is triggered by compressed malformed data that get decompressed at runtime. Such data is typically stored in streams.
The general idea of all exploitation procedures is attempting to bypass protections such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), by resorting to a combination of Heap Spraying and Return Oriented Programming (ROP) gadgets. The main idea here is that the attacker fills the Heap with multiple replicas of NOP sleds and shellcode (which are built through ROP gadgets -an ensemble of instructions that belong to existing, legitimate libraries, and which can be combined to build malicious routines).
However, there are also other types of less-used attacks, which have been especially proposed in the last years. One is particularly interesting, as it is based on type confusion (CVE-2017-16379). The function IsAVIconBundleRec6 (belonging to the AcroRd32.dll library) receives as a parameter a void pointer, and it tries to automatically determine its type by checking some bytes of the object to which it points. Normally, this operation succeeds, but in some cases, a pointer that should be invalid is considered to be valid due to crafted bytes of the target object. When such condition is exploited, an attacker can take control of the EIP register and execute arbitrary code. As Reader is progressively patched, it is not surprising to see such kind of attacks, as attackers have to conceive more advanced ways to execute attacks properly.
ActionScript-Based Attacks
As PDF files can visualize Flash content through Reader support to Adobe Flash technologies, one way to exploit Adobe Reader is triggering vulnerabilities of its Flash component by embedding malicious ShockWave Flash (SWF) files and ActionScript code. Normally, such code is used in combination with JavaScript: while executing ActionScript triggers the vulnerability itself, the rest of JavaScript code carries out and finalizes the exploitation. This exploitation technique was particularly popular in 2010 and 2011. In a similar way to what we described for JavaScript, multiple vulnerabilities can be exploited by using ActionScript. In the following, we describe the prominent ones.
• Memory Corruption. This vulnerability occurs when specific pointer values in memory get corrupted in a way that they point to other memory areas, controlled by the attacker. It is the most used way to exploit Flash components. • ByteCode Verification. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute code in uninitialized areas of memory. • Corrupted File Loading. This vulnerability is triggered when parsing specific, corrupted video files.
Generally speaking, vulnerabilities that affect the Flash components of Adobe Reader are more complex to exploit than others. This is because two types of scripting code must be executed, and exploitation is typically carried out in two stages (first -ActionScript execution, then -JavaScript code). For this reason, attackers typically prefer exploits that are simpler to be carried out. Moreover, Flash-based technologies will be dismissed in some years, giving attackers further reasons not to develop further exploits.
File Embedding
This vulnerability exploits the presence of embedded, malformed content inside the PDF file.
Typically, decoding such content leads to automatic memory spraying, which can be further exploited to execute code. The file contents that are mostly used for such attacks are the ones related to images (such as BMP, TIFF) or fonts (such as TFF). In other cases, such as the direct execution of EXE payloads, the content is not necessarily malformed, but simply directly executed (this also avoid to execute malicious JavaScript code to exploit the vulnerability further). An example of the latter attack is reported in Listing 3, in which the CVE-2010-1240 vulnerability is exploited [37] . This example is particularly interesting, as the executed payload is simply the Windows Command Shell cmd.exe. However, the arguments of such shell execution lead to the creation of a malicious .vbs (Visual Basic Script) that, after being run on the command shell, further drops malicious executables (in particular, the very dangerous Zeus trojan). The example we have just described hints that particularly advanced attacks can have multiple execution stages. For example, running executables may lead to the execution of other file formats with other vulnerabilities, whose final goal is dropping the final piece of malware.
A REVIEW OF MACHINE LEARNING FOR PDF MALWARE DETECTION
As infection vectors may embed complex variants of malicious scripting codes, they can easily evade simple detection heuristics. For this reason, machine learning has been used as a valid solution to detect as many attack variants as possible. In particular, concerning PDF files, multiple detectors were developed in the last decade that implemented such technology. Therefore, the aim of this Section is providing an overview of the characteristics of such detectors. However, as this survey focuses on the implications of adversarial attacks against machine learning systems, this Section only concerns systems that employ supervised machine learning to perform detection, meaning that we will not discuss PDF malware detectors that employ rule-based or non-supervised approaches (e.g. [32, 34, 42, 47, 56, 57, 62, 63] ). For a more detailed description of such systems, we refer the reader to more general purpose surveys ( [40] ). The primary goal of machine-learning detectors for malicious documents is discriminating between benign and malicious files. They can operate by analyzing and classifying information retrieved either from the structure or the content of the document. More specifically, all systems aimed to detect malicious PDF files share the same basic structure (reported in Figure 2 ), which is composed of three main components [37] : Learning-based PDF malware detection (1) Pre-Processing. This component parses PDF files by isolating the data that are crucial for detection. For example, it can extract JavaScript or ActionScript code, select specific keywords or metadata, and so forth. (2) Feature Extraction. This component operates on the information extracted during the pre-processing phase, by converting it to a vector of numbers. Such vector can represent, for example, the presence of specific keywords or API calls, or also the occurrences of certain elements in the file. (3) Classifier. The proper learning algorithm. Its parameters are first tuned during the training phase to reduce overfitting and guarantee the highest flexibility against polymorphic variants. According to the three components described above, Table 2 provides a general overview of machine learning-based PDF detectors that have been released since 2008. Note how each system employs a combination of different components types (e.g., a specific preprocessing module with a specific learning algorithm or feature extractor). Therefore, we structure 
Pre-processing
As reported in the previous Sections, the pre-processing phase is crucial to select data that are used for detection. Table 2 showed that there are two major types of pre-processing: static and dynamic. Static preprocessing analyzes the PDF file without executing it (or its contents). Dynamic pre-processing employs techniques such as sandboxing or instrumentation to execute either the PDF file or its JavaScript content. While static analysis is considerably faster and does not require many computational resources, dynamic analysis is much more effective at detecting obfuscated samples, meaning that certain obfuscation routines are almost impossible to be de-obfuscated automatically (in many cases there are multiple stages of obfuscation). As employing a sandboxed Adobe Reader is quite expensive computationally and not practical for the end-user, most detection systems rely on static parsing. When describing pre-processing tools, we generally divide them into two categories, which we list in the following:
• Third Party Processing. This category includes parsers that have been already developed and tested, and that do not directly depend on detection tools, thus being included as external modules in the system. The main advantage of employing third-party parsers is that they include many functionalities that are less prone (although not immune, as we will discuss more in detail later) to bugs. However, they can also embed unneeded functionalities and can be quite heavy computationally. • Custom Processing. This category includes parsers that have been written from scratch, in order to adapt to the information required from the detection system. As such parsers are tailored to the operations of the detectors, their functionalities are rather limited and much prone to bugs, as typically they have not been extensively tested. Table 2 clearly shows that the favorite developers choice is relying on already existent tools, mostly because of their resilience to bugs and capabilities to adapt to most file variants. For this reason, in the following, we provide a more extensive description of third-party parsers, which is summarized in Table 3 . Table 3 . An overview of third-party parsers employed by machine learning-based PDF malware detectors. Each parser has been evaluated concerning three key components of the file. When the parser can completely analyze that specific component, we use the term Complete; when only certain operations (in brackets) can be performed, we employ the term Partial; finally, when no support is provided, we use the term None.
Parser PDF Structure JavaScript Embedded Files
Origami [30] Complete Partial (Code Analysis) Complete JSand [15] None Complete Partial (Analysis) PDFId [49] Partial (Key Analysis) None None PeePDF [19] Partial (Obj. Analysis) Partial (Code Analysis) Complete PhoneyPDF [54] None Complete None Poppler [21] Complete Partial (Extraction) Complete
The Table is organized as follows. Each parser analyzes three main elements of the PDF file: the PDF structure, the embedded JavaScript code and the presence of embedded files of any type (including further PDF files). Such elements are analyzed with three degrees of complexity: Complete, Partial or None. The impact of such complexity degrees depends on the analyzed PDF element. In the following, we provide a more detailed description of each degree of complexity for each PDF element:
• PDF Structure. It refers to all elements of the PDF structure that are not related to embedded code, such as direct or indirect objects, metadata, and so on. When parsers completely support PDF Structure, it means that they can not only extract and analyze object and metadata, but also that they can perform structural changes to the file, such as object injection or metadata manipulation. When the support is partial, we typically refer to parsers that are only able to analyze objects, but not to manipulate them. When the support is set to None, it means that the PDF Structure is not analyzed at all. Poppler [21] and Origami are the only parsers that provide the possibility of properly injecting and manipulating content inside the file. • JavaScript. It refers to the embedded JavaScript code inside the file. When the support to JavaScript is complete, it means that the code can be either statically and dynamically analyzed (to overcome de-obfuscation), for example through instrumentation. When the support is partial, it means that the code can be only statically analyzed (or even only extracted, as it happens in Poppler [21] ), leading to some limitations when heavy obfuscation is employed. Finally, when no support is provided, the JavaScript code is not even extracted.
JSand and PhoneyPDF [15, 54] are the only parsers that completely support JavaScript instrumentation and execution. • Embedded Files. It refers to the capability of parsers to extract or inject embedded files (such as executable, office documents, or even other PDF files). When the support is complete, parsers can either extract or inject embedded files into the original PDF. When the support is partial, embedded files can only be extracted (or analyzed). Finally, when no support is provided, it means that embedded files cannot be extracted. Origami, PeePDF and Poppler [19, 21, 30] support extraction and analysis of embedded contents.
From the description provided by Table 3 , it can be inferred that no parsers can extract or manipulate all elements of the PDF file, although some of them allow for more functionalities. For this reason, the choice of the parser to be used is related to the type of information that is needed by the learning algorithm to perform its functionality. In the following, we provide a brief description of each third-party parser.
• Origami [30] . This parser, entirely written in Ruby, allows users to navigate the object structure of PDF files, to craft malicious files by injecting code or other objects, to decompress and decrypt streams, and so forth. Moreover, it embeds popular information to recognize JavaScript API-based vulnerabilities (see Section 3.1). • JSand [15] . This parser was part of the Wepawet engine to perform dynamic analysis of PDF files. It could execute the embedded JavaScript code to extract api calls and de-obfuscate code. Moreover, it could inspect embedded executables to reveal the presence of additional attacks. Unfortunately, the Wepawet service is currently not available, hence it is not possible to test JSand anymore. • PDFId [49] . This parser has been developed to extract the PDF name objects (see Section 2.1).
It does not perform additional analysis on embedded code or files. • PeePDF [19] . This parser, entirely written in Python, is able to perform complete analysis of the PDF file structure (without being able to inject objects). It allows to inject and extract embedded files, and it provides a basic static analysis of JavaScript code. • PhoneyPDF [54] . This parser, entirely written in Python, performs dynamic analysis of embedded JavaScript code through instrumentation. More specifically, it emulates the execution of the JavaScript code embedded in a PDF file, in order to extract API calls that are strictly related to the PDF execution. This parser does not perform any structural analysis or embedding files extraction. • Poppler [21] . Poppler is a C++ library that is used by popular, open-source software such as X-Pdf to render the contents of the file. For this reason, the library features complete support to PDF Structure parsing and managing, as well as JavaScript code extraction and injection of embedded files.
Concerning custom parsers, it is important to observe that we could not access the tools that adopted such parsers, as their source was not publicly released. Hence, we could only refer to what has been stated in the released papers [44] [45] [46] 52] . While raw bytes parsers ( [44, 52] ) only focused on extracting byte sequences from the PDF, the parser adopted by PDFRate ( [45, 46] ) analyzed and extracted the object structure of the PDF file, with a particular focus on PDF metadata. However, the latter parser has been used as a test-bench for adversarial attacks, and researchers proved it could be easily evaded [13, 59] (see the next Sections).
Feature Extraction
Feature extraction is essential to PDF malware classification. In this phase, data obtained from the pre-processing phase are further parsed and transformed to vectors of numbers of a fixed size. Table 4 provides an overview of the feature types that are used by each PDF detector. We can divide the employed feature types into three categories:
• Structural. These features are related to the PDF structure, and most concern the presence or the occurrence of specific keywords (name objects) in the file. Others include metadata or the presence/count of indirect objects or streams. • JS-Based. These features are related to the structure of JavaScript code. Most of them concern lexical characteristics of the code (for example, the number of specific operators in the file), used API calls, or information obtained from the code behavior (e.g., when shellcodes are embedded in the attack). • RAW Bytes. This category includes features that concern sequences of bytes taken as ngrams (i.e., groups of n-bytes, where n is typically a small integer).
Most PDF detectors only implement feature extraction methodologies that include only one type of feature. Byte-level features were among the first ones employed to solve the problem of PDF [52] x x N-Grams Cova, 2010 (Wepawet) [15] x Execution-Based x Laskov, 2011 (PJScan) [31] x Lexical x Maiorca, 2012 (Slayer) [39] Keywords x x Smutz, 2012 (PDFRate) [45] Metadata x x Srndic, 2013 (Hidost) [48, 58] Key. Sequence x x Corona, 2014 (Lux0R) [14] x API-Based x Maiorca, 2015 (Slayer NEO) [35, 36] Keywords x x Smutz, 2016 (PDFRate -New) [46] Metadata x x malware detection, and the very first works in the field mostly adopted them [44, 52] . Typically, these features are represented by simple sequences of bytes taken in groups of n, where n is typically a very small integer. The reason for such a small number is because the feature space can explode quite easily. Using 1-gram means a total of 256 features, while a 2-gram means 65536 features. For this reason, this solution has not been considered very practical on standard machine learning models. Moreover, byte-level features do not typically convey explainable information on the file characteristics.
JavaScript-based features have been mostly adopted by Wepawet,PJScan and Lux0R [14, 15, 31] . The general idea behind using these features is to isolate functions that perform dangerous operations, as well as detecting the presence of the obfuscated code that is typically associated with malicious behaviors. Wepawet [15] extracted information obtained from the code execution in an emulated environment. Such information is mostly related to code behavior, such as the type of parameters that are passed to specific methods, the sequences of suspicious API calls during execution, the number of bytes that are allocated for string operation (which may be a hint of heap spraying), and so forth. PJScan resorted to lexical information extracted from the JavaScript code itself, such as the count of specific operators (such as + or ( )) that are known for being abused when obfuscated code. Moreover, it performs additional checks on the length of strings to point out the presence of suspicious exploiting techniques (such as buffer overflow or heap spraying). Finally, Lux0R exclusively operates on JavaScript API calls that belong to the Adobe Reader specifications. In particular, each call is evaluated only once (after being extracted during the preprocessing phase), leading to a binary feature vector of calls. While such features are excellent to analyze and detect attacks that carry JavaScript code, they cannot represent other types of attacks, such as the ones that involve the use of embedded files. Structural approaches have been considerably used in recent years. The main idea, in this case, was trying to address all possible attacks reported in Section 3, by using the most general approach possible. This idea also revolves around the concept that malware samples are structurally different from benign ones. For example, they typically feature fewer pages than benign samples, and the representation of the content is significantly scarcer. The first approaches (adopted by Slayer and by its extension Slayer NEO) [35, 36, 39] focused on counting the occurrences of specific keywords in the file. The keywords were regarded as relevant when they appeared at least once on enough files in the training set. Hidost [48, 58] evolved these approaches by employing sequences of keywords. More specifically, each feature was extracted by walking the PDF tree and evaluating how keywords were sequentially referred. The number of features was limited to 1000, as using all the possible features would have led to an explosion of the algorithm in terms of complexity. Finally, PDFRate [45, 46] focused on more general-purpose features that included, among the others, the number of indirect objects, the properties of the stream contents (e.g., the number of upper-case and lower-case characters) and so forth. Moreover, the approach also makes use of information obtained from metadata to identify suspicious behaviors (for example, when the PDF file is not generated by popular tools). Albeit structural approaches proved to be effective at detecting even ActionScript-based attacks, they exhibit some limitations that will be better described in the next Sections.
Learning and Classification
Regardless of the chosen feature representation, after feature extraction, each PDF file is represented in terms of a numerical vector x ∈ R d . Thanks to this abstraction, it is possible to use any kind of learning algorithm to perform classification of PDF documents. All PDF malware detectors resort to supervised approaches, i.e., when the labels of the samples that compose the training set are known. More specifically, a learning algorithm is trained to recognize a set of known examples D ∈ {x i , y i } n i=1 , labeled either as legitimate (y = −1) or as malicious (y = +1). During this process, the parameters of the learning algorithm (if any) are typically set according to some given performance requirements. After training, the learning algorithm provides a classification function f (x) ∈ {−1, +1} that can be used to classify never-before-seen PDF files as legitimate or malicious. Notably, the appropriate learning algorithm is selected depending on the features that are used for classification and on the training data are used. Tree classifiers have been used by most PDF malware detectors, and proved to be a very effective choice to solve this problem [14, 36, 39, 45, 46, 52, 58] . In particular, ensemble models such as Random Forest or Boosting showed very high accuracy under limited false positives. Such effectiveness is because such classifiers well adapt to heterogeneous information, and in particular to features such as counts. However, depending on the feature types, other solutions may be feasible. For example, PJScan [31] resorts to SVM classifiers, Wepawet [15] to Bayesians and Shafiq et al. [44] to Markov models (which can be suitable to manage n-gram models). Nevertheless, the results attained by this models show that tree-based classifiers provide the highest performances among the tested models.
Detection Results
In the following, Table 4 .4 presents the results attained on PDF malware detection by the most popular, machine learning-based systems in the wild. Notably, the goal of the Table is not to show which system performs best but to provide indications on how such detectors generally cope with PDF attacks in the wild. A direct comparison between the performances attained by all systems would not be fair, considering that each system was trained and tested on different samples, with different training/test splits and classifiers. Therefore, in order to build a Table that is coherent and meaningful, we followed these guidelines:
• We considered the results attained by systems that exclusively detected PDF files. Therefore, we ruled out [15, 44, 52] , as their datasets also included other file types besides PDF. • Our Table includes the overall number of malicious and benign samples, the percentage of the dataset used for training the system, and the True Positives (TP) values attained in correspondence of the relative False Positives (FP). Note that we referred to values that were explicitly stated in each original work (we did not consider any cross-analysis). Some of the examined works reported multiple results attained by changing the features, classification parameters, and data distribution [31, 45, 48, 58] . Hence, for each system we focused on the following information (the reader may check the original works for more details):
• PJScan [31] . We considered as malicious the files that were regarded as detected in the original paper, and as benign the files that were regarded as undetected. We reported the performances obtained with native tokens and on JavaScript files only, as PJScan does not make any analysis of non-JavaScript files. • PDFRate [45] . We reported the performances related to the lowest number of false positives that are stated in the original work. • Hidost [48, 58] . We reported the result attained by the work in [58] , as it clearly states the attained TP and FP percentages. • PDFRate (New) [46] . As performances were stated in the paper by considering multiple thresholds for classification, we report the results attained at 0.5 threshold. The choice was made to obtain false positives values that were similar to the ones attained by the other systems.
The attained results show some interesting trends. First, certain works employed unbalanced datasets that contain more benign than malicious files [45, 46, 58] . The reason for such choice is to reflect the fact that malicious files in the wild are significantly less than benign ones. However, this could bias the performance metrics, especially when calculating ROC curves. Other works used most of the dataset for training [14, 35, 36, 39] , which means that such systems would require more training data to perform classification correctly. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe that almost all systems attained very high accuracy with low false positives. Such positive results mean that multiple information (feature) types can be equally effective at detecting PDF malware.
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AGAINST PDF DETECTORS
One aspect that particularly characterizes PDF malware from other document-based formats is that it has been extensively studied under adversarial environments, i.e., by considering the possibility that attackers may directly target the architectural components of detection systems (including the learning algorithms, as envisaged in [6, 9, 59] ). Barreno et al. [5] first considered this problem in 2006, subsequently extended by follow-up work [4, 26, 28] . In particular, Biggio et al. [6, 7, 11] gave a crucial contribution to the research by showing that non-linear models were extremely vulnerable against gradient-based test-time attacks, conversely to the belief that such algorithms might have been more robust, as stated in [58] . More recently, there has been considerable development in the field by applying adversarial machine learning to deep learning for computer vision (with the creation of the so-called adversarial examples [23, 51] ). The reason why adversarial machine learning has been extensively studied on PDF malware is that the structure of PDF files allows for fine-grained modifications that well-adapt to how adversarial attacks are typically performed. In the following, we provide a detailed overview of adversarial attacks against PDF detectors, which are based on solid theoretical foundations proposed in previous years. In order to fully understand how adversarial machine learning has been applied to PDF malware detection, it is crucial to introduce the basics of the discipline by introducing the attacker model. Such basics can be also applied to other adversarial machine learning problems, including the ones concerning deep learning applications.
Attacker Model
Before going deeper into how adversarial attacks have been concretely applied to PDF files, it is important to describe the general model of the attacker, introduced by Biggio et al. [8, 9] . Such model is built on the well-known taxonomy of Barreno et al. [4, 5, 26] , in which attacks against machine learning systems are categorized under three axes: security violation, attack specificity and attack influence. By exploiting this taxonomy, it is possible to define multiple attack scenarios that depend on three major elements: the attacker's goal, the knowledge of the system, and the capability of manipulating the input data.
Attacker's Goal. It is defined in terms of two characteristics, i.e., security violation and attack specificity, which we describe in the following.
• Security violation When speaking about systems' security, we refer to their integrity, availability, or privacy. Violating their integrity means having malware samples undetected; their availability is compromised by misclassifying benign samples as malware, causing a denial of service to legitimate users; and their privacy is violated if it leaks confidential information about its users. • Attack specificity It can be targeted or indiscriminate, based on whether the attacker aims to have only certain samples misclassified (e.g., a specific malware sample to infect a particular device or user), or if any misclassified sample meets her goal (e.g., if the goal is to launch an indiscriminate attack campaign).
As in this paper we focus on attacks against malicious PDF files detectors, we will primarily examine the case in which the attacker aims to violate the integrity of the system (hence, having malicious samples classified as benign) in an indiscriminate way (meaning that no sample has a specific priority over the others).
Attacker's Knowledge. The attacker can possess multiple levels of knowledge of the targeted system [4, 5, 8, 9, 26, 59] . In particular, (i) the training data D; (ii) the feature extraction/selection algorithm Φ and the corresponding feature set X, i.e., how features are computed and selected from the input data; (iii) the learning algorithm L(D, f ), and its decision function f (x), including its (trained) parameters (e.g., feature weights and bias in linear classifiers), if any. The attacker's knowledge can be represented in terms of a vector θ belonging to a space Θ that encodes knowledge of the data D, the feature space X, the learning algorithm L(D, f ) and its decision function f . For example, complete (perfect) knowledge of the system means that θ = (D, X, L) ∈ Θ. The attacker's knowledge concerning PDF files can be modeled under specific degrees that will be described more in detail in Section 5.2. Such degrees span from zero knowledge (i.e., neither the features nor the model of the system is known) to perfect knowledge of the system (i.e., both the features and the system model are known).
Attacker's Capability. The attacker's capability of manipulating the input data is defined in terms of the so-called attack influence, as well as by some application-specific constraints. We describe both in the following.
• Attack Influence. This defines whether the attacker can only manipulate data at test time (exploratory influence), or if she can also contaminate the training data (causative influence). Such contamination is possible, for instance, if the system is retrained online using data collected during operation which can be manipulated by the attacker [5, 9, 26] . • Application-specific constraints. These constraints define how and to which extent the input data (and its features) can be modified to reach the attacker's goal, according to the given application. In many cases, these constraints can be directly encoded in terms of distances in feature space, computed between the source malware data and its manipulated versions [6, 12, 16, 22, 33, 53] . In general, the attacker's capability can thus be represented in terms of a set of possible modifications Ω(A) performed on the input samples A.
In the case of PDF files, we generally assume that attackers perform test-time attacks with the constraint that features values can only be increased. Decreasing the feature values would mean, most of the times, removing parts of the PDF file, with the risk of completely breaking its functionalities. For example, removing an object may lead to breaking the object hierarchy, which would cause the file to display different or partial contents.
Evasion Attacks against PDF Readers
According to the the attacker model described in Section 5.1, various attacks can be performed that involve multiple levels of system knowledge and different modi operandi. More formally, evasion attacks can be written as:
The equation above tells the attacker which features of the sample z ∈ A should be modified to maximally decrease the value of the classification function, i.e., to maximize the probability of evading detection [6, 9] . Note that, depending on the manipulation constraints Ω(z) (e.g., if the feature values are bounded), the set of features to be manipulated is generally different for each malicious sample. All the attacks that will be described in this Section share the following three characteristics:
• They aim to violate the system integrity.
• They are performed at test time.
• They are performed by injecting content into the file (with only one exception, which will be described later).
Attacks against PDF readers can be organized in two main categories, which depend on the knowledge that the attacker possesses about the target system, and in particular about its learning algorithm.
• Unknown Learning Algorithm. In this category, the attacker does not have any knowledge of the learning algorithm, which means that she cannot exploit the decision function to optimize her attacks. These attacks are generally faster to be performed in practice, but they are not guaranteed to be effective against all systems. Two main attacks further specify this category: (1) Empirical (Zero Knowledge) attacks. These attacks do not require any knowledge neither of the features employed by the system nor the training model. Either benign or malicious PDFRate, PJScan, Slayer N., Hidost Unknown (Zero K.) Yes material is injected without having any certainty of the effect that such an injection would do to the system. (2) Mimicry Attacks. The attacker can collect a surrogate datasetD including malware and benign samples, and knows the feature space. Accordingly, θ = (D, X). In this case, the main idea is manipulating malware samples to make them as close as possible to the benign data (in terms of conditional probability distributions or distance in feature space). • Known Learning Algorithm. This category includes those attacks for which the attacker knows the learning algorithm. Therefore, she can perform evasion strategies such as gradient descent in order to attain a more efficient attack. Two attacks can further specify this category: (1) Limited-Knowledge (LK) Attacks. The attacker knows the learning algorithm L used by the targeted system and can learn a surrogate classifier on the available data. The knowledgeparameter vector can be thus encoded as θ = (D, X,f ), beingf the surrogate classifier used to approximate the true f . (2) Perfect-Knowledge (PK) Attacks. This is the worst-case setting in which also the targeted classifier is known to the attacker, i.e., θ = (D, X, f ). Although this is not that likely to happen in practice, this setting is particularly interesting as it provides an upper bound on the performance degradation incurred by the system under attack, and can be used as a reference to evaluate the effectiveness of the system under the other simulated attack scenarios.
The state-of-the-art attacks carried out in these years have been summarized in Table 6 . Accordingly, this taxonomy has been organized by following three directions: (i) the systems that have been targeted by the attacks; (ii) the knowledge that the attacker possesses about the learning model; (iii) the fact that the attack can be concretely created and implemented. This last point is particularly of interest, as implementing the sample whose feature vector can evade the target system is not always an easy task. Notably, injecting material may change the file semantics (i.e., the file may behave differently than the original one) or even break the whole file. We now provide a better description of the attacks that have been performed against PDF detectors. First, we present an insight into how contents can be injected by exploiting parsers vulnerabilities. Then, we describe the attacks according to the taxonomy proposed in this Section.
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Practical Implementation
In the previous Section, we stated that all attacks belonging to the taxonomy provided in Table 5 .2 (with only one exception) are performed through content injection. For this reason, it is crucial to understand how it is possible, in practice, to inject contents in PDF files without compromising their functionality or semantics. There are three different strategies that can be used to inject content into PDF files, as shown in Figure 3 [37]:
• By injecting objects after the x-ref table, and in particular after the EOF marker of the file. These objects are never parsed by Adobe Reader or similar, as their presence is not marked in the cross-reference table (a technique used for example by [59] . • By using the versioning mechanism of the PDF file format, i.e., injecting a new body, x-ref table, and trailer, as the user directly modified the file (e.g., by using an external tool -see Section 2; this technique can be especially used to inject EXE files, as shown by [38] ). • By directly operating on the existing PDF graph, adding new objects to the file body and re-arranging the x-ref table accordingly (a strategy used, for instance, in [64] ). The first strategy is easy to implement, but it strongly relies on exploiting vulnerabilities of the parsing process. Like clearly explained by Carmony et al., [13] , all PDF detectors parsers suffer from vulnerabilities, as none of them fully implement the PDF specifications released by Adobe. Such weaknesses are particularly evident in custom parsers, which may hide some strong misalignments to the behavior of Adobe Reader. For example, the parser implemented by PDFRate [45, 46] analyzes objects that can be injected after EOF, which makes attacks such as the one proposed by Srndic [59] easy to be performed. However, such injection strategy can be made ineffective by merely patching the pre-processing module of the PDF malware detector to be consistent with Adobe Reader. The second strategy is more advanced than the previous one, as the Cross-Reference table parses the injected objects, and therefore they are considered as legitimate by the Reader itself. In this way, it is also straightforward to add embedded files or other malicious (or benign) contents that can be used as an aid to perpetuate a more effective attack. Such injection strategy can, however, be countered by extracting the content of each version of the PDF file and process it separately. The third strategy is more complicated to implement and to detect, as it seamlessly adds objects in a PDF file by reconstructing the objects and their position on the X-Ref Table. In this way, it possible to manage and re-arrange the X-Ref table objects without corrupting the file [13] . Existing objects can also be modified by adding other name objects and rearranging the x-ref table positions accordingly. Notably, it is essential to ensure that the embedded content (i.e., the exploitation code) is correctly executed when the merged PDF is opened. The correct execution of the embedded content is often not easy to achieve, as it requires injecting additional objects specifically for this purpose.
Attacks with Unknown Learning Algorithm
These attacks can be performed without knowing the target learning algorithm. As reported in Section 5.2, there are two major types of attacks that can be carried out, depending on the knowledge level owned by the attacker. In the following, we describe the results attained by both attacks in previous state-of-the-art works.
Mimicry. The typical approach concerning attacks in which the attacker knows at least the feature set used by the target system is based on a technique called mimicry, in which benign information is injected into files recognized as malicious by the classifier, with the goal of making malware more similar (concerning the extracted features) to their benign counterparts. This strategy has been explored by Smutz et al. and Corona et al. in their analyses [14, 45] . In particular, Smutz et al. injected information concerning the most discriminant features for the PDFRate classifier to malicious samples, in order to evaluate the amount of benign data required to bypass detection. The attained results showed that it was possible, by only changing six discriminant features, to decrease the classifier accuracy by more than 20% [45] . As a possible countermeasure, the authors proposed to avoid using discriminating features whose low perturbation may lead to changing the classification results. Corona et al. adopted a different injection strategy to attempt to evade Lux0R. In the employed attack, the authors added all the features belonging to many benign samples to malicious targets and measured how the classifier detection was affected. Results showed that, due to the dynamic nature of the features employed, the classifier was still able to detect most of the malicious samples in the wild, despite the modifications they received [14] .
Zero Knowledge (Reverse Mimicry). Concerning scenarios in which attackers have zero knowledge of the learning algorithm employed by the system, Maiorca et al. [38] introduced Reverse Mimicry approaches. The idea behind such attacks is elementary: injecting a small malicious payload into benign files with the hope that the classifier decision does not change. Such a strategy is exactly the opposite to the one implemented by mimicry attacks: while such attacks are based on the injection of much benign information, reverse mimicry tends to minimize the amount of malicious information injected. The difference between mimicry and reverse mimicry attacks is depicted in Figure 4 , which represent the two scenarios against a linear algorithm on a bi-dimensional feature space. The red and blue dots represent, respectively, malicious and benign samples. The goal of each attack is making the violet (attack) dot stay in the benign region. While mimicry attacks must force malicious samples cross the decision boundary, reverse mimicry attacks must avoid the modified benign samples to cross the boundary. There are three types of reverse mimicry attacks, according to different types of malicious information that can be injected: • JS Embedding. This injects JavaScript codes directly inside the file objects. Current implementations feature the injection of only one JavaScript code, but it is technically possible to scatter the code through multiple objects in the file. Notably, this would increase the probability of the attack to be detected, as more keywords have to be used to indicate the presence of the embedded code. • EXE Embedding. This technique exploits the CVE-2010-1240 vulnerability, thanks to which it is possible to run an executable from the PDF file itself directly. In the implementation proposed by Maiorca et al., [38] , the EXE payload was injected through the creation of a different version. • PDF Embedding. This strategy features the injection of malicious PDF files in the objects of the target PDF file. More specifically, attackers can inject specific keywords that cause the embedded file to open automatically. This technique can be particularly effective, especially because multiple embedding layers can be easily created (for example, embedding a PDF file in another PDF file, which is finally embedded in another file). Maiorca et al. used PeePDF to carry out such embedding strategy. However, the embedding process is prone to bugs, due to the complexity of the PDF format. Nevertheless, it is possible to employ libraries such as Poppler to improve the injection process. The efficacy of Reverse Mimicry attacks has been explored in various works. Maiorca et al. demonstrated that all Reverse Mimicry variants were able to evade systems that adopted structural features, such as PDFRate [38] . Further works [35, 36, 46] proposed possible strategies to mitigate such attacks. In Slayer NEO, Maiorca et al. proposed a combination of features that are extracted both from the structure and the content (in terms of embedded code) of the file, along with the extraction and separate analysis of embedded PDF files. In this way, it is possible to significantly mitigate such attacks (especially PDF Embedding ones, which are entirely detected), although more than 30% of JS Embedding and EXE Embedding variants still manage to bypass detection [35] [36] [37] . Smutz et al. proposed a solution based on improving the tree-based detection algorithm of PDFRate by using tree-ensembles and a voting mechanism. The attained results showed that using such a learning algorithm significantly improved the detection of Reverse Mimicry attacks. An exception to such an improved detection is the PDF embedding variant, which still manages to evade the system, as PDFRate does not perform any analysis of possible embedded PDF payloads [46] . The PDF Embedding case is particularly of interest, as its efficiency strongly depends on the parsers' limitations (e.g., not being able to extract the embedded files). This concept has been explored on a broader way by Carmony et al., who showed that each parser (including advanced ones) on which PDF detectors are based could be evaded due to implementation bugs, design errors, omissions, and ambiguities. For this reason, attackers can be motivated to mostly target the pre-processing modules of detection systems, thus efficiently exploiting their vulnerabilities. Indeed, the authors created working proofs of concept with which they were able to evade both third-party and custom (PDFRate) parsers [13] .
Results. In the following, we summarize the results attained by testing evasive examples created with reverse mimicry strategies. We report the results attained by [37] , in which 500 samples for each reverse mimicry variant (for a total of 1500 samples) were created and tested against multiple systems in the wild [31, 35, 45, 46, 58] . Such comparison is the most recent and fair between multiple systems on evasive datasets. All systems (except for PDFRate, which is provided as an online service) were trained with the same dataset composed by more than 20000 malicious and benign files in the wild. Figure 5 reports the attained results. For each attack and system, we report the percentage of evasive samples that were detected. Note that Slayer NEO has been tested in two variants: the keys variant reflects the work made in [39] (in which the system only operated by extracting keywords as features), while the all variant reflects the full functionality of the system, as tested in [35] . Results clearly show that each system has its strengths and weaknesses. For example, Slayer NEO well performs against PDF Embedding attacks due to its capability of extracting and analyzing embedded files, while PJscan is excellent at detecting JS Embedding attacks and PDFRate provides reliable detection of EXE Embedding. However, none of the tested systems can effectively detect all reverse mimicry attacks at the same time, which also means that no system is completely safe even against simple evasion attacks.
Attacks with Known Learning Algorithm
As stated in Section 5, scenarios in which the attacker possesses knowledge about the target learning algorithm are also referred to as test time evasion attacks [6] . Such attacks against PDF detectors have been especially explored by Biggio et al. [6, 7] and by Srndic et al. [59] . The works made by Biggio et al. were the first to explore both perfect and limited knowledge attacks against linear and non-linear models. The authors attacked the algorithm employed by Slayer [39] , by adopting a gradient-descent based approach on three types of classifier: neural networks, linear and RBF support vector machines. The attained results showed that, with a minimal number of injected keywords (even less than 10 for the linear algorithm), it is possible to evade any classifier under perfect knowledge scenarios easily. Under limited knowledge scenarios, the efficacy of such an attack is reduced by the fact that the attacker has to learn a surrogate algorithm to perform its attacks. However, all classifiers are completely evaded by simply increasing the number of changes to the file. Most are evaded after 30 − 40 changes, which means injecting that number of keywords. These results showed, for the first time, that non-linear malware detectors are vulnerable [45] . To this end, they employed the perfect knowledge scenario by reconstructing the whole PDFRate system, and by concretely building the evasive sample by injecting the selected features for evasion after the file EOF. Albeit effective at evading the target system, the injection strategy may be easily counteracted by improving the parsing process [59] . Xu et al. targeted PDFRate and Hidost by injecting the target features directly on the PDF file objects. Instead of employing gradient descent strategies, the authors resorted to genetic algorithms. This approach is particularly interesting because it is the only one in which features have also been removed from the target file, and it also proved to be very effective at evading both systems. However, it also requires a very high computational complexity due to the employed genetic algorithm, and might not be suitable to attain fast evasion [64] .
DISCUSSION
From the descriptions we provided in Sections 4 and 5, it is clear that a bulletproof solution to detect all possible variants of malicious PDF files has not yet been released. Conversely, the possible attacks that can be performed grow year by year, thus creating severe issues concerning the reliability of machine learning-based detectors. This concept can be extended not only to PDF files but also to other kinds of detectors, from SPAM to executables and Android for mobile platforms. We believe that this is due to a lack of security-by-design principles in most of the current released systems. More specifically, adversarial machine learning has become popular only recently, and this would require a change of paradigm when designing specific systems components. There are at least three things that a proper detection system for PDF malware should employ to be effective against standard and evasion attacks:
• Reliable Parsing. Proper parsing should always include, among the others: (i) the extraction of the embedded content (that should be analyzed separately, either with the same or with different detectors); (ii) using consolidated parsers (e.g., third-party libraries or, in general, parsers whose specifications are the closest to the official specs); (iii) robustness against malformed files (including benign ones) that may make the parser crash. • Proper Feature Engineering. Research showed that structural features are not adequate, alone, to provide reliable detection of evasion attacks. However, when used in combination to features related to JavaScript code or other properties (such as the presence of Flash), they can be a precious ally against evasive variants. In particular, we would recommend designing features that are hard to be modified. Dynamic features are generally more robust, as the attacker should change the file behavior in order to change the feature value. However, when it is not possible or feasible to analyze PDF files dynamically, combining different types of static features can be a winning solution that may significantly increase the effort that is required by the attacker to evade the target systems. • Robust Learning Algorithms. Research should push on developing algorithms that are more robust against perturbations made by attackers. Generally speaking, linear models may introduce strongly unbalanced feature values which may make the model easy to evade if the attacker has enough knowledge of its targets. On the contrary, non-linear models may be harder to explain and control, and it could be harder for system designers to develop reliable classification systems. Therefore, we recommend extreme care in choosing the model that best suits the feature model, while avoiding possible overfitting that may lead to compromise the system in the long term.
The guidelines described above are not useful only for PDF detectors, but for all malware detection systems that may be targeted by adversarial attacks. We believe that a correct application of the principles described above can be genuinely beneficial and can constitute a substantial aid to increase systems security.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a survey of malicious PDF detection in adversarial environments. This work has been structured in three parts: the first part focused on describing the current attacks and vulnerability in the wild against PDF readers; the second part described the state-of-the-art, machine learning-based approaches to the detection of the attacks described in the first part; finally, we provided a detailed insight into the adversarial attacks that can be carried out to evade machine learning detection. The core idea of this work is that the lessons learned from the experience of PDF malware detection can also be applied to other file formats that can be exploited by malware.
We believe that future work should focus on a more rigorous application of security-by-design principles when building detection systems. In this way, it will be possible to offer real, active mitigation of the numerous evasion attacks that are being progressively used in the wild.
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